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Executive Summary 
 
Roadway departure crashes represent some of the most severe crashes for vehicle occupants. In 
2016, these crashes comprised approximately 65 percent of all fatalities and 54 percent of serious 
injuries throughout Kentucky. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) seeks to mitigate 
roadside departure crashes through various means, particularly the installation of roadside barriers 
such as guardrail. Each year, district offices submit their requests for guardrail needs, including 
new installations. Due to high volume, KYTC must prioritize prospective guardrail installations 
to match available funds with the most critical, or unsafe, sites. The KYTC guardrail rating 
program (GRP) was established in 1989 as a process for identifying and prioritizing all guardrail 
needs. Despite periodic updates, the program no longer meets the transportation industry’s safety 
guidelines and policies. As a result, the Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) developed a new 
GRP methodology incorporating transportation best practices.  
 
KTC researchers conducted a literature review of national and state guardrail practices and 
assessed the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide, the Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware, and 
the Highway Safety Manual. The manuals did not provide clear guidance on prioritizing guardrail 
needs. They did establish warrants for establishing guardrail needs, which researchers used to 
further refine the proposed methodology. FHWA has issued various documents over the years 
related to guardrail, but most focus on structural components and testing. The research team also 
performed an online search query across 23 state DOTs to examine their guardrail programs. While 
all states had internal guardrail programs, the research team identified two states, California and 
Virginia, with methodology useful for KYTC’s program. California’s use of run-off-road (ROR) 
crashes and Virginia’s cost-based guardrail measures both provided insights into the development 
of the new GRP methodology for Kentucky.  
 
KTC examined the existing GRP, including all 32 rating elements. The newly developed GRP 
model focused on two main factors: crash frequency and crash severity. Crash frequency indicated 
the probability of a vehicle departing the roadway, while crash severity measured the impact to the 
vehicle’s occupants after a crash, most notably, crashes involving injury or death. Rankings for 
guardrail need locations should maximize safety outcomes for run-off-road crashes, and crash 
severity was the primary condition indicating the need for guardrail. However, where many highly-
ranked sites across the state had roadside hazards commonly associated with severe crashes, crash 
frequency became increasingly important to consider in reducing the overall number of severe 
crashes.  
 
With a focus on crash frequency and severity, the research team and study advisory committee 
chose 8 individual rating elements and assigned scoring attributes. All scored rating elements met 
three criteria: (1) influenced crashes through crash severity, crash frequency, or both per published 
research studies; (2) allowed for quantitative determination; and (3) remained comparable across 
different projects. The research team developed four initial weighting models using the criteria. 
Along with KYTC input, the team developed a final model with the following assigned rating 
elements and weighted percentages (totaling to 100 per project): 
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The proposed model combined crash severity and crash frequency concepts through scored rating 
elements to identify the most at-risk locations for run-off-road crashes. Overall, the new GRP 
model did not differ significantly from the previous version but there were ranking changes 
amongst the project sites. Overall, the research team identified five recommendations for KYTC: 
 
• Adopt the new GRP model methodology for use in ranking guardrail need projects across 
the state 
• Provide KYTC personnel, including district offices, with the newly revised guardrail 
survey form to collect the necessary data 
• Provide information and training sessions to KYTC personnel on the development rationale 
for the new model and its subsequent implementation  
• Update the GRP online application and back-end IT architecture to match the new model 
data collection and processing requirements 
1. Speed Limit (5%) 2. Lane Width (5%)
3. Maximum Embankment Slope (18%) 4. Maximum Embankment Height (18%)
5. Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes (18%) 6. Excess Expected Crashes (18%)
7. Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object (18%)
8. Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope (18%)
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1. Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Roadway departure crashes occur when vehicles leave the roadway, encroach upon the shoulder, 
and then crash at some distance from the travel lane. The most serious crashes occur when the 
vehicle strikes a roadside fixed object or overturns due to steep slopes found alongside the road. 
Roadside objects may include trees, utility poles, rocks, embankments, and bridge walls. Highway 
design engineers and planners often seek to mitigate roadside hazards through established safety 
criteria outlined in the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide. Guardrail and other types of longitudinal 
barriers are used to deflect and protect vehicles from encountering roadside hazards.  
 
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) District Offices identify their guardrail needs and 
submit them to the KYTC Division of Maintenance. The Division of Maintenance is responsible 
for prioritizing guardrail needs across the state and choosing the sites for new installation. 
Maintenance officials prioritize guardrail needs using the guardrail rating program software. The 
Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) originally developed KYTC’s guardrail rating 
methodology through a 1989 research study (Report KTC-89-39, “Warrants and Guidelines for 
Installation of Guardrail”). KTC, in conjunction with KYTC, periodically refined the guardrail 
program, most notably in 2002 and 2009. The 2002 effort created an online database and software 
user interface to allow district offices to input their guardrail preference locations. The 2009 
updates included: (1) revised crash data reflecting the most recent statistics of roadside departure 
crashes, (2) the critical rate calculator as the mechanism for obtaining crash data, and (3) hazard 
rating descriptive text and template photographs. For the third update, the text and photographs 
informed end users on the appropriate hazard rating to use when assigning subjective hazard 
ratings to guardrail locations. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The Division of Maintenance is responsible for identifying and prioritizing guardrail needs along 
KYTC roads. The current KYTC system used to assess and rate guardrail needs—known as the 
guardrail rating program (GRP)—last received an update in 2009. Since that time, the Highway 
Safety Manual (HSM) has adopted a more rigorous methodology involving crash/accident data 
elements. KYTC’s “accident rate” element within the current rating system uses legacy critical 
crash numbers and rates as the foundation. However, the HSM’s “Potential for Crash Reduction” 
factor has largely replaced critical crash numbers and rates due to increased statistical reliability. 
Therefore, KYTC is exploring the adoption of HSM’s updated crash factor into their GRP.  
 
The research team also reviewed elements of KYTC’s GRP and compared them to national 
guardrail best practices to find additional improvements to the current system. Finally, since the 
user interface and data inputs into the guardrail rating software directly influence the final ranking 
results, researchers examined the guardrail need survey form. Differing backgrounds and 
experience levels for district personnel responsible for entering the data may introduce subjectivity 
into the process.  
 
1.3 Objective 
The Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) evaluated KYTC’s GRP and recommended updates 
to improve the methodology behind prioritizing guardrail installations. The research team also 
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evaluated and improved the statistical reliability and user interface for the guardrail rating 
software, thereby maximizing safety outcomes. The project objectives are as follows: 
 
• Conduct literature review of state DOT best guardrail practices 
• Evaluate the current KYTC GRP 
• Update the GRP to suit KYTC’s current needs 
• Draft report of results and improvements to the GRP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program 5 
2. Literature Review 
 
The KTC research team conducted a comprehensive literature review on guardrail standards and 
other state’s best guardrail practices. The literature review focused on procedures and policies used 
to prioritize guardrail site placement, as well as methodologies that maximize safety within an 
established budget. This chapter discusses the guidance on guardrail prioritization provided by 
various technical and regulatory authorities, including AASHTO, Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), and state departments of transportation.   
 
2.1 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) is a non-
profit advocacy organization that promotes transportation. In this role, it fosters research and 
education programs serving technical practitioners, policy-makers, and the public. AASHTO has 
led many efforts in developing transportation best practices, including roadside hardware. The 
KTC research team reviewed current AASHTO manuals for information regarding guardrail 
infrastructure. The findings are described further below. 
  
2.1.1 Roadside Design Guide 
The AASHTO Committee on Design, Technical Committee on Roadside Safety published its most 
recent Roadside Design Guide (4th edition) in 2011. 1 This synthesis manual provided highway 
officials and engineers with best practices relating to roadside safety.  Researchers reviewed this 
edition for factors warranting possible updates to Kentucky’s existing guardrail prioritization 
program.  The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) originally adopted criteria from the first-
released Roadside Design Guide, then called “Highway Design and Operational Practices Related 
to Highway Safety”2, as the basis for its GRP.    
 
The research team reviewed the latest manual and found the most relevant changes in Chapter 5, 
Roadside Barriers. This chapter provides technical requirements on different roadside barriers 
(e.g., guardrail, cable barrier, etc.) and recommendations on their placement to minimize the 
severity of roadway departures. The majority of factors that impact safety remained unchanged 
from the 1988 Roadside Design Guide, to include: embankment height, embankment side slope, 
roadside obstacles (i.e., culvert inlets and trees), speed, and annual average daily traffic (AADT). 
Therefore, these factors remain valid for roadside safety.   
 
The Roadside Design Guide also contains an independent safety analysis program, called the 
Roadside Safety Analysis Program (RSAP).  While useful, KYTC has adopted the practices in the 
Highway Safety Manual for all of its safety program analysis.  The RSAP uses a different approach 
to estimate crash frequency than the Highway Safety Manual.  Yet, many contributing factors are 
the same in both analyses.  Consequently, the RSAP program was not considered for determining 
guardrail rating criteria.  
 
2.1.2 Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware 
Researchers reviewed the AASHTO Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware, better known as 
MASH,3 for potential guardrail rating factors that could be added to Kentucky’s existing guardrail 
prioritization program.  The MASH primarily focuses on crash testing procedures used to evaluate 
roadside barriers, including guardrail and guardrail end-treatments, and authorizes their use on the 
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federal highway system. In fact, the MASH describes several guardrail systems that meet crash 
testing standards. One such system, the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS), was adopted by KYTC 
in 2017.  The MASH also provides guidance on conducting in-service performance evaluations 
(ISPE) for highway maintenance programs. Yet, the MASH does not provide warrants or 
recommendations for identifying optimal guardrail locations. Therefore, it could not provide 
additional insight into KYTC’s guardrail prioritization methods.   
 
2.1.3 Highway Safety Manual 
Next, the research team assessed AASHTO’s Highway Safety Manual (HSM)4 for guardrail 
placement guidelines. The HSM provides highway officials with methods and statistical tools to 
evaluate highway safety, particularly in estimating crashes and assessing countermeasures to 
reduce them. The HSM does not specifically address the issue of guardrail placement. In this 
context, it did not provide additional guidance on prioritizing guardrail installation needs. Yet, it 
did provide detailed safety methodologies used in today’s state of practice. Therefore, HSM 
concepts have been adopted into KYTC’s current policies and processes and were used within the 
new GRP. Additional details on KYTC’s use of HSM methodologies are discussed further below. 
 
KYTC uses the HSM as the basis for implementing safety concepts into its policies and procedures. 
The critical rate factor (CRF) compares a segment’s actual crash rate to a crash rate that is 
considered critical, or much greater than the average crash rate for a segment of that roadway type. 
KYTC defines critical crash rates as those rates greater than or equal to three standard deviations 
above average for a given roadway type. 5 Yet, recent research has shown that CRF is not the most 
accurate or reliable method to compare a segment’s crash performance to similar type segments. 
CRF assumes that crashes and traffic volume have a linear relationship, which may not always be 
true. The CRF does not address regression to the mean bias, meaning it does not account for 
temporal crash fluctuations. 6  
 
The HSM improves safety performance evaluations of segment-based crash frequencies through 
statistically rigorous methodologies. This peer-reviewed manual determines excess expected 
average crash frequencies with an Empirical Bayes adjustment.7 Kentucky’s Strategic Highway 
Investment Formula for Tomorrow (SHIFT) model uses the same HSM methodology to evaluate 
safety across all statewide proposed projects.8 KYTC has adopted the term Excess Expected 
Crashes, or EEC, for this analysis. The EEC relies on two safety metrics: predicted crashes from a 
safety performance function (SPF) and expected crashes from the empirical Bayes (EB) method.  
 
SPFs are models that predict crashes, typically using the variables of segment length and traffic 
volume. SPFs must be calibrated to local crash conditions for specific crash types in order to 
accurately predict crash frequencies on a given roadway. The Empirical Bayes method adjusts the 
SPF predicted crash frequency for a site using the location’s observed crash history (i.e., observed 
frequency) to account for regression to the mean bias, resulting in the EB expected crashes (i.e., 
expected frequency). Next, the EEC is calculated as the difference between the EB adjusted crash 
estimate and the SPF crash prediction. This means positive EEC locations experience higher 
crashes, on average, than expected based on similar-type, similar-volume locations. Conversely, 
negative EEC locations experience fewer crashes, on average, than expected based on similar-
type, similar-volume locations. The SPF graph below illustrates these terms in relation to one 
another: 
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Figure 1 Crash Frequencies9 
 
2.2 Federal Highway Administration 
Upon completion of the AASHTO review, the research team assessed federal standards and 
guidelines for guardrail placement. This analysis investigated the following documents from 
FHWA’s Roadway Departure Safety website10: 
 
• FHWA Roadway Departure Strategic Plan11 
• An open letter to all in the highway safety hardware and roadside design community dated 
May 26, 201712 
• FHWA Memorandum on the subject of In-service Performance Evaluation and Continuous 
Monitoring of Roadside Safety Features dated November 17, 200513 
• Guardrail 10114 is a document on FHWA’s Roadway Departure website that outlines the 
purpose and function of guardrail.  This document does not address where guardrail 
installation may be warranted. 
• Report to Congress – Roadside Safety Hardware ID methods15 
• FHWA Memorandum on Federal-aid Reimbursement Eligibility Process for Safety 
Hardware Devices16 
 
These documents focus on testing infrastructure components, rather than warrants. Essentially, the 
FHWA guidance provided the “how” on guardrail installation, but less on the “where”. Similar to 
other literature reviewed, the FHWA guidance did not provide prescriptive guidance on 
prioritizing guardrail site placement. 
 
2.3 State Departments of Transportation 
KTC researchers evaluated policies and practices for guardrail site selection and installation across 
various state departments of transportation (DOTs). This was performed through an online 
EEC 
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guardrail program survey, whereby researchers conducted online search queries for guardrail 
warrant programs and prioritization procedures for state DOTs. They ultimately selected and 
examined 23 individual state DOT websites for their policies, manuals, and guidance. The 
reviewed states included: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  
  
During this process, researchers noted that all 23 state DOTs made their guardrail installation 
procedures and material specifications available through their public websites. Each state also had 
an internal guardrail warrant plan—an established process indicating when guardrail installation 
is required at a given location. Yet, some states relied solely on national guidance for their guardrail 
warrant program, primarily, the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide. Fourteen states actually 
established their own guardrail warrant programs tailored to the needs of their state. These 
programs sometimes included guardrail prioritization procedures. While useful, the individual 
guardrail warrant programs varied significantly across their scopes and the years they were 
enacted. The research team evaluated all 14 programs to determine if any programs or components 
might be suitable for adoption in Kentucky. The summarized results are shown below:      
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Table 1 State DOT Guardrail Warrants & Prioritization 
 
 
Based on this research, the research team narrowed down this list to two states of interest: 
California and Virginia. Both states had robust guardrail programs that warranted further analysis. 
The Caltrans and Virginia DOT guardrail policies and procedures are discussed below.   
 
2.3.1 Caltrans 
The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) establishes uniform practices for roadside 
barrier installation and maintenance through their Division of Traffic Operations. Caltrans lists 
five major criteria in selecting locations for their guardrail installation: collision history, roadway 
alignment, operating characteristics, climate conditions, and roadside recovery area. First, they 
analyze a site’s collision history to determine the incidence of run-off-road (ROR) crashes. 
Elevated ROR crash rates help justify guardrail installation. Challenging roadway alignment 
characteristics, such as isolated or short-radii curves represent another potential guardrail need. 
Traffic volume, speed, and merge/weave areas are three distinct operating characteristics that may 
require guardrail installation. All three characteristics are frequently associated with ROR crash 
types, which guardrail helps prevent. Caltrans evaluates the frequency and/or severity of climate 
State Guardrail Warrants or Prioritization Procedure Established Policy Year
Alaska Spreadsheet tool to determine if guardrail is a cost-effective 
countermeasure for a location
1999
Arizona Minimum 75' guardrail installations, state warrants for guardrail 
installation with curbs
2018
California Crashes,  alignment, volume, speed, merge/weave areas, climate 
and roadside recovery areas to determine guardrail need
2017
Georgia Developed a warranting standard above the RDG. No 
prioritization
2018
Illinois Rigid objects that are more than 4" above surrounding ground 
warrant guardrail
1998
Indiana Prioritize location guardrail installations based on crash rate and 
AADT
1999
Maine Guardrail is warranted where adequate vehicle recovery area 
cannot be provided
2017
Minnesota Uses AASHTO guides to check for warrants in addition to 
personnel evaluation. No Prioritization
1999
New York Guardrail is installed if clear zone is insufficient or hazards 
cannot be made crash worthy, and if funding is available
1999
Ohio If warrants are met, guardrail is installed without prioritization 1999
Rhode Island Install guardrail in conjunction with scheduled projects if it is 
warranted
1999
Virginia Risk-based comparison tool is used to prioritize locations needing 
guardrail installation or upgrade
2001
Washington Guardrail is prioritized based on benefit-to-cost ratio 1999
Wyoming Uses RDG to check for clear zone warrants with no prioritization 
of installations
1999
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conditions such as fog, rain, snow, or ice as contributing factors to ROR crashes. Finally, any fixed 
object placed within the recovery zone represents a hazard warranting mitigation, with guardrail 
used as one possible countermeasure.17  
 
Conversely, other factors may prevent guardrail installation from further consideration. The 
availability of resources (i.e., funding) and the roadway type occasionally limits the opportunity 
to install guardrail. For instance, the agency may not install guardrail per routine warrants (e.g., 
fixed object found in the recovery zone) if multiple driveways are located nearby.    
 
The Caltrans guidance describes explicit conditions and exceptions for guardrail installation, but 
remains limited in its usefulness as a prioritization methodology. The research team did not find 
any tools designated for new guardrail installation. However, for existing guardrail, Caltrans 
prioritizes and schedules repairs for damaged guardrails based on several risk factors: highway 
type, extent of damage, and probability of second vehicular strike prior to repair. The damaged 
guardrail receives a rating of High, Medium, or Low to indicate its repair priority. 18 
 
2.3.2 Virginia DOT and Multistate Survey 
The Virginia Department of Transportation provides several tools for selecting and prioritizing  
guardrail installation locations. Its hazard database tool logs roadside hazards on roadways that 
merit guardrail installation and notes any locations already possessing guardrail. The hazard 
database tool also stores traffic volumes, crashes, guardrail strikes in existing installations, and 
recorded citizen complaints. The second tool, the guardrail screening tool, determines a monetary 
value associated with crashes at a given location. This tool uses traffic volumes, crash history, 
crash severity, and crash costs as the variables. A third tool also helps prioritize locations for new 
guardrail installation. Users must provide inputs across a range of parameters to use the tool. The 
inputs for each location include:     
 
• Hazard length: length of hazard parallel to roadway  
• Severity index: 1-10 based on site characteristics  
• Annual average daily traffic (AADT) 
• Daily vehicle-miles traveled (DVMT) 
• main run cost: cost of linear portion of guardrail 
• run-on cost: end treatment cost 
• run-off cost: end treatment cost 
• removal cost: cost to remove any existing guardrail 
• other costs: additional improvements such as paint or reflectors 
• total site improvement cost: total site cost 
 
The tool uses provided inputs to calculate five separate statistical measures for each site: total 
guardrail mileage, severity, vehicle-miles, severity-miles, and severity-vehicle-miles. Each site is 
ranked across the five categories, essentially resulting in five distinct ranked columns. Users may 
choose any individual list, or a combination thereof, to produce their own overall ranking. The tool 
also allows users to evaluate installation costs in conjunction with these ranks. For example, the 
tool can calculate a cost ratio for each category, such as total guardrail mileage per installation 
costs at that location. These cost ratios provide officials with another analysis tool in prioritizing 
between new guardrail installations. It should be noted that this tool does not draw from a statewide 
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requested guardrail installation database such as Kentucky has. Rather, the tool is used to compare 
new guardrail installations across a limited number of site candidates across the state.19 
 
While developing these tools, the Virginia DOT reviewed and assessed other state DOT guardrail 
installation and prioritization practices for possible inclusion into their program. Their survey cited 
guardrail procedures and best practices across the nation, including KYTC’s GRP. Virginia 
claimed that Kentucky’s GRP helped them identify factors for guardrail need. However, they were 
uncertain how KYTC developed its weighting assignments for each guardrail factor, which 
hindered their ability to fully adopt it. The list below summarizes the results of Virginia’s guardrail 
survey: 20  
 
• Washington uses a benefit/cost ratio to compare guardrail locations. 
• Rhode Island recommends upgrading/installing guardrail in conjunction with other 
scheduled projects.  
• Indiana evaluates potential locations with high crash rates and prioritizes installations using 
traffic volume. 
• New York evaluates potential locations to determine if clear zone is sufficient and installs 
guardrail if it is insufficient. Guardrail is also installed when hazards cannot be made crash 
worthy. No prioritization performed, although funding limits the number of installations. 
• Ohio uses warrants to determine when guardrail is needed, but does not prioritize 
installation locations.  
• Minnesota and Wyoming use AASHTO guides to determine when guardrails are 
warranted. No prioritization is used.  
• Alaska uses a spreadsheet to perform cost-effectiveness analysis using traffic data, grade, 
number of lanes, lane width, highway type, slope, obstacles, severity of hazard, and cost 
factors to determine if guardrail is economical, but did not state if the spreadsheet is also 
used to prioritize locations. 
 
The Virginia DOT conducted their survey in 1999. Due to the time elapsed, the research team 
investigated the originally surveyed states’ procedures and practices to determine if they were still 
current. In this effort, the research team reviewed the public-domain websites and any guardrail 
reports/manuals for the state DOTs listed on the survey. They found no additional evidence in the 
form of updated policies, procedures, or best practices that deviated from the original survey 
findings.   
 
        
 
  
 KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program 12 
3. Guardrail Rating Program 
 
KYTC’s Division of Maintenance is responsible for identifying and prioritizing guardrail needs 
across the state. They receive requested guardrail projects from each district office. Similar to most 
transportation programs, the infrastructure demands greatly exceed the resources available to fund 
them. Consequently, KYTC relies upon their GRP to assess and prioritize new guardrail 
installations for all requested locations. KYTC’s GRP currently uses the methodologies developed 
by KTC in 1989, with 2002 and 2009 updates (see Background section). KYTC employees use a 
guardrail survey form to collect information and assign attributes to their potential guardrail site, 
and submit this information through their online GRP. A copy of their current guardrail survey 
form is provided in Appendix A. The   below provides an illustration of the GRP output with 
project rankings. 
 
Table 2 KYTC Guardrail Rating Program 
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3.1 Guardrail Rating Elements 
KYTC has an established guardrail rating system that evaluates potential guardrail installations 
across 32 site conditions. Devised in 1989, the Warrants and Guidelines for Installation of 
Guardrail report provides the original methodology KYTC used to prioritize guardrail 
installations.21 The report describes the guardrail rating elements used when evaluating locations 
for guardrail need. Elements #1-13 help KYTC assign objective attributes to proposed guardrail 
locations. These attributes characterize a site location by road name, route, latitude, and longitude, 
among others. Because these elements are objective, they do not receive a score to be used in 
determining overall rankings.    
 
The remaining elements (#14-32) correlate with safety conditions — primarily run-off-the-road 
crashes — at a given site. The current GRP assigns numerical values to ten elements in the set, 
identified as the hazard-index point system. These ten determine how the guardrail need at a given 
site will be prioritized, or ranked. The hazard point index elements and the maximum number of 
points allowed per category include:  
 
• Typical Embankment Slope (10 points) 
• Typical Embankment Height (10 points) 
• Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance from Edge of Traveled Way (10 points) 
• Are there any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane? (5 
points) 
• Lane Plus Shoulder Width (10 points) 
• Speed Limit (10 points) 
• Average Daily Traffic (10 points) 
• Number of Accidents (15 points) 
• Accident Rate (15 points) 
• Subjective Hazard Rating (5 points) 
 
The combined total from these ten elements calculates the score at any given location (see 
Appendix B for the original guardrail hazard-index point system and accompanying descriptions). 
In the final step, the prioritization process sorts all guardrail need sites by their single assigned 
score. KYTC selects those locations with the highest scores for future guardrail installations. All 
guardrail rating elements, both the scored elements and non-scored, are shown in Table 3. Note 
that all ten elements used in the hazard-index point system are indicated by double asterisks (**).    
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Table 3 Current KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Highway District
2 County
3 Route
4 Road System
5 Terrain
6 Road Name
7 Rural/Urban
8 Road Type
9 Latitude
10 Longitude
11 Mile Post - Begin
12 Mile Post - End
13 Length (miles)
14 Typical Embankment Slope**
15 Typical Embankment Height**
16 Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Way**
17 Distance From Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone
18 Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane?**
19 Select Existing Barrier Type
20 Existing Barrier Condition
21 Lane Plus Shoulder Width**
22 Lane Width
23 Speed Limit**
24 ADT**
25 Number of Accidents (if Available)**
26 Accident Rate (if Available)**
27 Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating**
28 Remove Linear Length of Guardrail
29 Install Linear Length of Guardrail
30 Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded Condition?
31 Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle?
32 Additional Comments
Item 
No. KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
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3.2 Guardrail Rating Evaluation 
Since the original GRP methodology was derived by KTC in 1989, it may contain terms or 
practices that are no longer used in today’s methodologies. The research team subsequently 
evaluated each guardrail rating element to determine if updates or removal were required. The 
evaluative process occurred through the framework of qualitative and quantitative criteria.     
 
3.2.1 Guardrail Rating Criteria 
The evaluation process involved a line-by-line analysis across all 32 rating elements through four 
criteria: appropriateness, weighting, consistency, and scalability. The research team selected these 
four criteria to examine the rating elements through different perspectives, and ultimately, to 
improve the overall methodology for selecting proposed guardrail locations. The definitions for 
these criteria are as follows: 
 
• Appropriateness - The degree of usefulness for an element within the guardrail rating 
program. 
• Weighting - The degree of importance or emphasis placed on an element if it retains the 
ability to disproportionately affect the outcome. 
• Consistency – A measure of the ability to clearly define data elements for the end user, 
minimizing the probability that data elements may be misinterpreted to affect outcomes. 
• Scalability – The degree to which a rating element can be assigned a flexible numerical 
value across a given range.   
 
The first criterion, appropriateness, represents the very foundation for each rating element’s 
inclusion into the guardrail prioritization process. A rating element must be relevant to the 
selection process, and if not, it could become a strong candidate for removal. In this context, all 
rating elements must be appropriate in terms of either: (1) usefulness as an assigned attribute for 
the guardrail site and therefore, provide a unique identifier (e.g., location, length, etc.) or (2) 
usefulness as a guardrail selection factor contributing to enhanced safety at that location (e.g., 
embankment slope, speed, etc.). The team evaluated each rating element’s level of appropriateness 
by low (L), medium (M), or high (H).  
 
The second criterion, weighting, assigns points to each rating element based on the current process, 
also known as the hazard-index point system. As previously stated, the current system only assigns 
weighting points to ten elements. The other elements were considered non-scoring elements, and 
may be used as defined attributes or conditions for the site. During this evaluation phase, the 
research team simply used KYTC’s current weighting scheme with their defined point system. 
Chapter 4 describes how the research team developed and analyzed different weighting schemes 
for the final, approved guardrail rating elements and assessed how they performed.        
 
The third criterion, consistency, measures how clearly defined data elements are for end users (e.g., 
district personnel) and how they promote a shared understanding. Consistently defines the 
probability that data elements may be misinterpreted, or even manipulated, so that the prioritization 
process could become skewed. For example, KYTC officials noted that one particular rating 
element, the roadside hazard rating, appeared to be more subjective than others. This meant that 
district personnel may not be assigning values to their individual site’s roadside hazard rating in a 
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consistent manner. The research team evaluated each rating element’s level of consistency by low 
(L), medium (M), or high (H).   
 
The fourth and final criterion, scalability, provides numerical scaling assignments to those 
elements, where appropriate, in order to improve the final safety outcome. This initial evaluation 
simply assigned numerical ranges based on KYTC’s current scale. Since only ten rating elements 
were scored, those same ten elements were the only elements assigned a numerical value 
corresponding to this metric. In the next phase of the project (see Chapter 4), the research team 
developed and analyzed different scalability schemes for the final, approved guardrail rating 
elements to promote improved flexibility in numerical prioritization. For example, some elements 
employed the use of a step or jump function in their numerical rating (e.g., critical number of 
crashes). These situations were assessed to determine if a sliding or continuous numerical rating 
definition may be more appropriate. The full results from the guardrail rating element evaluation 
for all four evaluation criteria is shown in Table 4.   
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Table 4 Evaluation of Guardrail Rating Elements 
 
Appropriatea Weightingb Consistencyc Scalabilityd
1 Highway District H 0 H NA
2 County H 0 H NA
3 Route H 0 H NA
4 Road System H 0 H NA
5 Terrain L 0 M NA
6 Road Name H 0 H NA
7 Rural/Urban M 0 M NA
8 Road Type M 0 H NA
9 Latitude H 0 H NA
10 Longitude H 0 H NA
11 Mile Post - Begin H 0 H NA
12 Mile Post - End H 0 H NA
13 Length (miles) H 0 H NA
14 Typical Embankment Slope* H 10 M 0-10
15 Typical Embankment Height* H 10 M 0-10
16 Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Way* H 10 H 0-10
17 Distance From Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone M 0 H NA
18 Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane?* H 5 H 0, 5
19 Select Existing Barrier Type M 0 H NA
20 Existing Barrier Condition L 0 M NA
21 Lane Plus Shoulder Width* H 10 H 0-10
22 Lane Width M 0 H NA
23 Speed Limit* H 10 H 0-10
24 Average Daily Traffic (ADT)* H 10 H 0-10
25 Number of Accidents (if Available)* M 15 H 0, 15
26 Accident Rate (if Available)* L 15 H 0, 15
27 Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating* M 5 L 1-5
28 Remove Linear Length of Guardrail L 0 H NA
29 Install Linear Length of Guardrail H 0 H NA
30 Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded Condition? H 0 L NA
31 Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle? H 0 M NA
32 Additional Comments H 0 L NA
* Rating Elements identified by present KYTC methodology as "Hazard Rating Points"
Item 
No. KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
Original Evaluation Criteria
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3.2.2 Guardrail Rating Analysis 
The KTC research team used the result from the evaluation criteria matrix to propose changes to 
the GRP. The majority of rating elements received a high mark for appropriateness; 21 received a 
High rating, while 7 were rated Medium and 4 were rated Low. The results for consistency 
followed a similar trend: 23 were rated High, 6 rated Medium, and 3 rated Low. Rating elements 
that received either Medium or Low warranted additional investigation by the research team, 
including the possibility of removal or modification. The weighting and scalability criteria were 
only applicable to the original hazard index rating elements. For these, the research team simply 
assigned the current weighting and scalar ranges to each scored rating element.  
 
After analyzing the scores for all the rating elements, the KTC research team presented their 
recommendations to the KYTC study advisory committee. During a February 26, 2019 meeting, 
KTC and the committee collectively decided upon the final changes to the existing guardrail rating 
elements. Those results are shown in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5 Guardrail Rating Element Recommendations 
 
No Change Remove Modify
1 Highway District X
2 County X
3 Route X
4 Road System X
5 Terrain X
6 Road Name X
7 Rural/Urban X
8 Road Type X
9 Latitude X
10 Longitude X
11 Mile Post - Begin X
12 Mile Post - End X
13 Length (miles) X
14 Typical Embankment Slopea X
15 Typical Embankment Heighta X
16 Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Wayb X
17 Distance From Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zoneb X
18 Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Travel Lane?b X
19 Select Existing Barrier Type X
20 Existing Barrier Condition X
21 Lane Plus Shoulder Widthc X
22 Lane Width X
23 Speed Limit X
24 ADT X
25 Number of Accidentsd X
26 Accident Rated X
27 Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating X
28 Remove Linear Length of Guardrail X
29 Install Linear Length of Guardraile X
30 Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded Condition? X
31 Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle?b X
32 Additional Comments X
KYTC Guardrail Rating ElementsItem 
No.
Status
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4. GUARDRAIL RATING REVISIONS 
 
The KTC research team and the KYTC study advisory committee collaborated to identify changes 
to the existing guardrail rating system. Guardrail rating elements were placed into four categories: 
no change, remove existing condition, modify existing condition, and propose new condition. 
Rating elements were assessed through the four criteria — appropriateness, weighting, 
consistency, and scalability — to strengthen the rating system. For example, changing the score 
for consistency of an element would ensure field personnel all interpreted or processed a condition 
in the same manner. In other instances, a condition was updated to reflect current transportation 
safety practices, such as implementing the Empirical Bayes method of crashes. Per the original 
guardrail condition matrix shown in Table 5, the full list of proposed revisions and descriptions of 
those changes follow.   
 
4.1 Description of Revisions 
 
4.1.1 Modified/Revised Rating Elements 
 
Item No. 14 – Typical Embankment Slope 
“Typical embankment slope" lacked consistency in its implementation. Field personnel may see 
typical as the average roadway embankment slope, or as a worst-case scenario, steep slope. The 
main purpose for guardrail installation is to reduce crash severity along a roadway corridor. The 
maximum embankment slope (or steepest) that occurs along a segment would likely result in the 
most severe crashes. Therefore, the guardrail rating element was changed to “Maximum 
Embankment Slope”. 
 
Item No. 15 – Typical Embankment Height 
“Typical embankment height" was the vertical height associated with the original typical 
embankment slope. Since the latter term was changed, its associated counterpart, typical 
embankment height, was updated to “Maximum Embankment Height”.  
 
Item No. 16-17 – Average Existing Roadside Recovery Distance From Edge of Traveled Way/ 
Distance from Edge of Pavement to a Fixed Object in Recovery Zone 
Both elements listed here incorporated concepts related to the clear zone and embankment slope. 
Per the Roadside Design Guide, the clear zone is "the unobstructed, traversable area provided 
beyond the edge of the through traveled way for the recovery of errant vehicles".1 The two main 
factors impeding a clear zone include adverse slope conditions and immovable, fixed objects in 
the runoff road area. It is critical to know the horizontal distance available within the clear zone 
prior to a vehicle encountering a roadside hazard such as adverse slopes and/or fixed objects. 
Therefore, this guardrail condition was split into two similar elements addressing each roadside 
hazard. They are: “Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest 
Fixed Object” and “Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Critical 
Slope”. It is important to note that only one of these elements will apply to a given location. This 
determination will use a worst-case scenario comparing the location of the fixed object with the 
critical slope. The hazard located nearest to the edge of through traveled lane will constitute the 
worst-case scenario.  
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Item No. 21 – Lane Plus Shoulder Width 
“Lane width" was captured as a distinct category, while "lane plus shoulder width" were two 
factors coupled together. Since both lane and shoulder widths were found to be key factors for 
roadside departures, both elements should each have their own category. Therefore, this element 
was revised to "shoulder width". 
 
Item No. 25-26 – Number of Accidents / Accident Rate 
The "number of accidents" and "accident rate" elements represent outdated safety performance 
metrics not aligned with recent Highway Safety Manual (HSM) guidance. Consequently, new 
elements aligned with national best practices and KYTC approved policies were required. The new 
elements “Empirical Bayes expected crashes” and “excess expected crashes” would replace 
“number of accidents” and “accident rate” using a series of derivations (described below). 
 
Researchers developed a Safety Performance Function (SPF) to predict run-off-road crashes for 
all the segments in the guardrail database. This SPF was developed using a statewide road dataset 
with similar characteristics to those in the guardrail database, and calibrated to use only run-off-
road crashes. This calibration allowed SPF to be used in any location in the guardrail database to 
predict run-off-road crashes. The resulting SPF model was as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑒𝑒−4.365 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇0.851 
 
Where, 
• ROR SPF is the predicted run-off-road crashes on a segment for a five-year period, 
• L is the segment length, and 
• AADT is the annual average daily traffic on the segment. 
 
This model was developed using crash data over the 2013-2017 time period. The theta parameter 
was 2.436, indicating the data had a strong fit within the model. 
 
Next, the team calculated the empirical Bayes (EB) expected crashes. This process combined SPF 
predicted crashes with historical crashes using a weighted parameter. The model’s parameter was 
based on the degree of correlation between its expected crashes and the historical crashes. This 
resulted in an expected crash value that was weighted between the empirical model and the 
historical crashes. The weight parameter was calculated using the following equation: 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 11 + (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡ℎ )𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  
 
 
Where, 
• Weight is the resulting weight parameter that will balance between the SPF and the 
historical crashes, 
• ROR SPF is the predicted crashes from the run-off-road SPF, 
• Length is the length of the segment, and 
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• Theta is the parameter describing how well the SPF correlates to the dataset (2.436 
for this model). 
 
The weight was then used to calculate the EB expected crashes using the following equation: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ∗𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 ∗ (1 −𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡) 
 
Where, 
• EB Expected Crashes is the empirical Bayes expected crashes, 
• ROR SPF is the predicted crashes from the run-off-road SPF (a five-year value), 
• Weight is the parameter calculated using the previous equation, and 
• Historical ROR Crashes is the actual number of run-off-road crashes on the segment 
in the last five years. 
 
Finally, to calculate EEC, the following equation was used: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 = 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 
 
Where, 
• EEC is the excess expected run-off-road crashes, 
• EB Expected Crashes is the empirical Bayes expected run-off-road crashes, and 
• ROR SPF is the SPF predicted run-off-road crashes. 
 
Item No. 29 – Install Linear Length of Guardrail 
“Install linear length of guardrail" element was expanded upon to reflect several important cost 
factors associated with the installation of new guardrail. The research team consulted with the 
study advisory committee and found that several factors contribute to new guardrail installation 
costs: length of guardrail to be installed, number of end treatments installed, shoulder preparation, 
cribbing, embankment in place, additional post length required, and guardrail connectors to a 
bridge. All these factors were included in the new rating analysis, however, they will not be 
weighted for scoring within the proposed rating system. Rather, KYTC will consider the new cost 
factors when determining their guardrail budget and installation project cut-offs. Furthermore, the 
combination of new cost factors may also assist KYTC decision makers when deciding upon two 
similarly-ranked projects in terms of safety. 
 
Item No. 31 – Can Hazard be Corrected by Relocation of the Obstacle? 
The "hazard relocation" element was appropriate for mitigating risk, but lacked a clear and 
comprehensive definition. Hence, the definition was expanded to address all risk mitigation 
options: relocation, removal, and redesign. In addition, this rating element was rarely utilized by 
respondents in their guardrail submittals. For the 4,602 data described previously, respondents 
answered affirmatively to this question for only 0.5 percent of submitted sites. The modified 
guardrail element became “Can the Fixed Object/s be Removed, Relocated, or Redesigned to 
Mitigate Risk (Y/N)?”. Any of these options can satisfactorily address risks associated with 
roadside hazards.  
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4.1.2 Removed/Deleted Rating Elements 
 
Item No. 5 – Terrain  
The "terrain" element scored low in the criteria for appropriateness. It was neither a unique 
roadway attribute used for identification, nor was it a rigorously defined characteristic used in 
safety analysis. Rather, the elements related to embankment slopes provide a clearly defined, 
measurable attribute helpful in safety analysis. Terrain was often inconsistently applied across 
districts. 
 
Item No. 18 – Are There Any Culvert Headwall or Culvert Openings within 5 Feet of Traveled 
Lane? 
The "culvert" element was removed since a culvert meets the definition of a fixed object. 
Therefore, a culvert would be identified through the new "fixed object" element category. 
 
Item No. 19-20 – Select Existing Barrier Type/Existing Barrier Condition 
The "existing barrier" and the "condition" elements were removed because they received medium-
to-low rankings for appropriateness. Each district office is responsible for selecting and submitting 
their proposed guardrail needs. To this extent, any existing barriers should be evaluated by the 
district to see how they might be upgraded or improved prior to submitting a guardrail need. 
Consequently, the study advisory committee deemed these elements as unnecessary for the rating 
process. 
 
Item No. 27 – Indicate Subjective Hazard Rating 
The "subjective hazard rating" was not clearly defined. Each district submitting a proposed 
guardrail need must rely on his or her own background, judgment, and expertise in determining 
what this element truly means. Therefore, it leaves the rating up for interpretation and introduces 
inconsistency into the process, as indicated in its low consistency ratin). Therefore, it was removed 
from the list of rating elements. 
 
Item No. 28 – Remove Linear Length of Guardrail 
The "remove linear length of guardrail" element was removed due to its low rating for 
appropriateness. Similar to the removal of the "existing barrier" element described earlier, each 
district should assess their individual site location and determine new guardrail needs. If existing 
guardrail no longer meet specifications, then the district may submit the site as a new project. 
 
Item No. 30 – Will Any New Guardrail Section be more Hazardous than Existing Unshielded 
Condition? 
This element was not clearly defined. Similar to the subjective hazard rating, this condition relied 
upon the background of the individual submitting the guardrail need project for its interpretation 
and was subject to inconsistency. Furthermore, KYTC provided GRP data to the research team, 
which contained all 4,602 guardrail sites under consideration. The research team analyzed this data 
and found that only 1.1 percent of site submittals answered affirmatively to this question. Due to 
this lack of clarity and low-response rate, this element was removed. The proposed GRP fully 
addresses the concept of roadside hazards and risk within other elements and ensures that proper 
warrants are used prior to any barrier installation, including guardrail. 
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4.1.3 New Rating Elements 
 
Route Suffix 
“Route suffix” was added as another unique identifier for roadway locations, to be used as needed. 
 
Describe Fixed Object/s (e.g., headwall, bridge end, etc.) 
Fixed objects should not be placed within the clear zone. This is defined as a roadside hazard, and  
was addressed in guardrail condition #17. However, the original methodology did not indicate the 
nature of the fixed object. This element will allow Central Office decision-makers to understand 
the type of fixed object present when making any evaluative determinations. It will also provide 
additional context on the roadside hazard and allow for further discussions.   
 
4.1.4 Proposed Guardrail Rating Element Matrix 
 
The newly proposed guardrail rating element list includes 34 distinct categories, and includes the 
changes discussed within this section. See Table 6 below, for a list of the proposed guardrail 
rating elements.   
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Table 6 Proposed Guardrail Rating Element Matrix 
 
No. Proposed KYTC Guardrail Rating Elements
1 Highway District
2 County
3 Route Prefix
4 Route Number
5 Route Suffix
6 Road System
7 Road Name
8 Rural/Urban
9 Road Type
10 Latitude
11 Longitude
12 Beginning Milepoint
13 Ending Milepoint
14 Length (miles)
15 Speed Limit
16 ADT
17 Lane Width (ft)
18 Shoulder Width (ft)
19 Maximum Embankment Slopea
20 Maximum Embankment Height (ft)b
21 Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object (ft)
22 Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope (ft)
23 Describe Fixed Object/s (e.g., headwall, bridge end, etc.)
24 Can the Fixed Object/s be Removed, Relocated, or Redesigned to Mitigate Risk (Y/N)?d
25 Empirical Bayes Expected Crashese
26 Excess Expected Crashesf
27 Linear Length of Guardrail (ft)
28 Number of End Treatments
29 Other Cost Factors - Shoulder Preparation
30 Other Cost Factors - Cribbing
31 Other Cost Factors - Embankment in Place
32 Other Cost Factors - Additional Post Length Required
33 Other Cost Factors - Guardrail Connector to Bridge
34 Additional Comments
Definitions for Proposed Modifications
a The steepest slope, or drop in elevation, occurring at the shoulder break along the identified roadway segment.
b The vertical height measured from the bottom of the maximum embankment slope to the edge of the through
traveled lane.
c The fixed object occurs multiple times along a roadway segment and maintains similar horizontal
offsets from the edge of through traveled lane (i.e., not highly irregular offsets), such as util ity poles.
Otherwise, the fixed object is categorized as a single, unique occurrence or incident.
d Refer to the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide, chapter 4, for risk mitigation options involving roadside hazards
within the clear zone. Any "Yes" responses will  merit further evaluation.
e Weighted crash estimate based on historical crash data and the safety performance function crash prediction.
f The difference between the Empirical Baye's expected crashes and the safety performance function's predicted 
crashes.
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4.2 Guardrail Rating Models 
Guardrail ratings should maximize safety outcomes for vehicles departing the roadway, or run-
off-road (ROR) crashes. The probability of a crash occurring at a given location is known as crash 
frequency. Locations considered prone to a high number of crashes might require increased focus 
if roadside hazards are prevalent. Still, the primary purpose for installing guardrail is to reduce 
crash severity for ROR crashes. A guardrail will not reduce the probability of a crash occurring. 
Rather, it mitigates the severity of ROR crashes when they occur.   
 
4.2.1 Crash Frequency Factors 
Crash frequency provides insight into the probability that a ROR crash may occur at a location. 
By itself, crash frequency does not justify the installation of guardrail. However, it may provide 
additional understanding into the likelihood of crashes occurring when prioritizing locations in the 
most need of guardrail repair or installation. Studies have shown several factors contributing to 
crash frequency including AADT, speed, lane width, and shoulder width.  
 
The annual average daily traffic (AADT) counts represent traffic volume along a given corridor. 
As research studies have shown, the frequency of crashes increase as AADT increases. Excess 
vehicle speeds have been tied to an increasing number of crashes, as well as crash severity.22 
Several research studies have shown connections between crash frequency and the widths of 
roadway lanes and shoulders, respectively. In both cases, decreasing widths contributed to an 
increasing number of crashes. Fitzpatrick et al., demonstrated narrower lane widths increased 
roadway departures for lanes less than 12 feet.23 Similarly, several researchers have examined the 
relationship between shoulder width and crash frequency. Most of these studies demonstrated that 
decreasing shoulder width led to increases in the crash rate. For instance, Zegeer and Deacon found 
that shoulder widths had a significant effect on crash rates.24     
 
4.2.2 Crash Severity Factors 
Guardrail represents a safety countermeasure that reduces crash severity for vehicles departing the 
roadway, or run-off-road (ROR) crashes. The Roadside Design Guide specifically recommends 
the installation of roadside hardware barrier devices, such as guardrail, to reduce the severity of 
ROR crashes.1 However, guardrail does not reduce the probability of a crash occurring, otherwise 
known as crash frequency. Due to close proximity to the edge of pavement, the installation of 
guardrail may lead to an increased frequency of ROR crashes. Crashes may occur as vehicles 
departing the roadway have less free space to maneuver and may inadvertently strike the guardrail 
prior to navigating back onto the roadway. Nevertheless, guardrail is an effective device to reduce 
crash severity for vehicles leaving the roadway, thus serving its intended purpose.   
 
Crash severity measures the effect of a crash on vehicle occupants. The Federal Highway 
Administration uses a KABCO injury classification scale to assess crash severity, ranging from 
non-severe to extremely severe crashes. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet similarly employs 
the KABCO acronym as defined by the following terms:25 
 
• K – Fatality 
• A – Incapacitating Injury 
• B – Non-Incapacitating Injury 
• C – Possible Injury 
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• O – Property Damage Only 
 
Many researchers have examined crash severity over the years and shared their results with the 
transportation safety community. In these studies, they have evaluated many different factors 
associated with ROR crashes and examined their influence on fatalities and injuries. Collectively, 
research studies have demonstrated a few factors that have the most direct impact on crash severity: 
steep slopes, fixed objects in the clear zone, and excessive speeds.  
 
Roadside slopes are found on the roadway’s adjacent embankment. The slope of primary concern, 
the foreslope, begins at the shoulder break. For fill sections, foreslopes decline in elevation from 
the roadway surface at different rates. The Roadside Design Guide categorizes foreslopes into 
three distinct categories: recoverable, non-recoverable, and critical. Recoverable slopes are flat 
slopes (1V:4H or flatter) that allow the vehicle to recover and readily reenter the roadway 
following departure. Non-recoverable slopes are steeper (between 1V:3H and 1V: 4H) slopes that 
are traversable but do not allow the vehicle to easily reenter the roadway following departure. 
Typically, the vehicle will continue down this slope until it reaches the toe. The steepest slopes are 
critical slopes and include any slope at 1V:3H or steeper. Vehicles will continue down these steeps 
slopes and are at increased risk for overturning, a leading factor in fatalities.1 
 
Critical slopes represent the greatest danger to vehicle occupants during ROR crashes. Roadside 
departures occurring along flat slopes with soils that support tires (and without fixed objects) 
usually result in minimal crash severity.26 Similarly, FHWA and the National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program have published studies demonstrating slope flattening reduces severe 
crashes, particularly fatalities and injuries.27,26 On the other hand, extreme slopes leading to 
overturned vehicles can result in the most dire outcomes. Neuman, et al. found that overturned 
vehicles comprised nearly 42 percent of all ROR single-vehicle fatalities.26 A Texas Transportation 
Institute (TTI) study discovered overturned vehicle crashes occurring on two-lane, rural roads in 
Texas were twice as likely to result in a fatality.28     
 
Fixed objects located in the clear zone are another significant roadside hazard impacting crash 
severity. Fixed objects are non-crashworthy objects that can disproportionately impact the 
vehicle’s trajectory (e.g., snagging) or speed (e.g., rapid deceleration) and will injure the vehicle’s 
occupants in the process. The FHWA and the National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
have shown that removing fixed objects in the clear zone will reduce crash severity for roadside 
departures.29,26 When fixed objects are not removed, the consequences may be severe. For 
instance, Zegeer et al. demonstrated that fixed objects frequently led to injury-producing crashes, 
such as those involving utility poles (49.7 percent).30 Neuman, et al. found that fatalities occurred 
when vehicles struck fixed objects, including trees (25.4 percent) and utility poles (7.2 percent).26   
 
Many research studies have examined vehicle speeds and their association with crash outcomes. 
Speed is a factor that has been shown to be a contributing factor for both crash frequency and crash 
severity. In the former, Liu and Subramanian examined single-vehicle ROR crashes and found that 
nearly 90 percent of those crashes involved speeding vehicles.31 The Institute for Road Safety 
Research discovered a similar finding that crash rates increased as speeds increased.32 Excessive 
speeds also are highly correlated with severe crash outcomes. Past FHWA studies investigated 
crash severity involving utility poles. They found a 50 percent chance of injury for collisions with 
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poles with impact speeds as low as 6 mph.33 A TTI study demonstrated a higher frequency of 
fatalities for vehicles traveling at excessive speeds, at 10 percent, versus 7.6 percent for those not 
speeding.28  
 
4.2.3 Weighting Analysis 
The research team developed a weighting scheme using the new guardrail rating elements. Similar 
to the original methodology, only specific rating elements were used to evaluate, or score, the 
benefits of guardrail installation in particular locations. The team initially selected 10 scored rating 
elements from the newly developed 34 rating element list. These elements were identified by their 
ability to meet defined, relevant characteristics for guardrail need. At a minimum, all scored rating 
elements possessed the following attributes: 
 
• Influence crashes—both frequency and severity—based on various research studies 
• Allow for quantitative determination 
• Provide project-by-project comparison 
 
Per the first criteria, some rating elements primarily correspond to crash frequency, while others 
correspond to crash severity. The research team determined an appropriate crash basis 
determination for each rating element using the research literature review discussed in sections 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The full list of scored rating elements and their corresponding crash element role 
(i.e., frequency, severity, or both) are shown in Table 7.  
 
The remaining 24 attributes from the approved guardrail rating element list (Table 6) did not meet 
scoring conditions for various reasons. Several attributes did not receive scoring because they 
served strictly as project site unique identifiers, such as highway route name, location (e.g., 
longitude, latitude), and road type. Consequently, they did not demonstrate the ability to influence 
crashes or allow for direct comparisons. In fact, rating elements #1-14 on the list met this 
definition. Other attributes (#23, #24) simply described a roadside hazard description, or a means 
to mitigate the roadside hazard. These attributes did not quantify the existing hazard or provide a 
basis for comparison. Therefore, they were not scored. Finally, the remaining rating elements #27-
34 described the factors that determined overall guardrail project costs. These include the overall 
length of guardrail, number of end treatments, and various special cost cases (e.g., cribbing or 
embankment in place). While useful for comparison purposes, the primary intent for the new 
methodology was to focus on safety, and allow for comparisons in that perspective.   
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Table 7 Scored Rating Elements by Crash Frequency and Severity 
 
 
4.2.4 Weighting Models 
Once the scored rating elements were identified, the research team developed four guardrail rating 
models, each with different weighting assignments placed on crash frequency and crash severity. 
To represent different guardrail prioritization methodologies, certain models assigned higher 
weighting scores to either frequency or severity. The team initially developed a total of four 
working models, described further below.    
 
Model #1 
All rating elements were weighted equally. This model assumed all guardrail rating elements 
associated with roadway characteristics, clear zone characteristics, and crash characteristics were 
no more or less important than other elements.  
 
Model #2 
Rating elements associated with crash characteristic (e.g., Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes and 
Excess Expected Crashes) were weighted slightly higher than the other elements. This model 
placed increased emphasis on the likelihood (or frequency) of a crash occurring at a given location.  
 
Model #3 
Rating elements associated with clear zone and crash characteristics were weighted significantly 
higher than those involving roadway characteristics. This model balanced crash frequency with 
crash severity.   
 
Model #4 
Rating elements associated with clear zone characteristics were weighted most heavily. This model 
placed increased emphasis on elements most directly associated with crash severity. 
 
On May 15, 2019, the research team and study advisory committee met and evaluated all four 
models. The two groups assessed the advantages and disadvantages of each working model and 
Crash 
Frequency
Crash 
Severity
15 Speed Limit  X X
16 AADT X
17 Lane Width (ft) X
18 Shoulder Width (ft) X
19 Maximum Embankment Slope X
20 Maximum Embankment Height (ft) X
21
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through 
Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object (ft)? a
X
22
Horizontal Distance from the Edge of Through 
Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope (ft)? a X
25 Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes*** X
26 Excess Expected Crashes**** X
KYTC Guardrail Rating ElementsItem No.
Rating Element Role
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decided upon model #3 as their preferred option, but with a few minor changes. For purposes of 
discussion, this new model will be referred to as model #5. The changes from the previous model 
included removing scoring consideration for AADT and shoulder width while simultaneously 
boosting numerical scoring for other categories. Overall, model #5 weighted clear zone and crash 
characteristics heavily. The full list of changes to this model are shown below:  
 
Model #5 
• Speed limit: decreased percentage from 14% to 5% 
• AADT: removed this element from receiving a weighted score (but will retain as a non-
scored rating element used as an attribute) 
• Lane width: no change to weighted percentage of 5% 
• Shoulder width: removed this element from receiving a weighted score (but will retain as 
a non-scored rating element used as an attribute) 
• Maximum embankment slope: increased percentage from 14% to 18% 
• Maximum embankment height: increased percentage from 14% to 18% 
• Horizontal distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the (nearest fixed object) OR 
(critical slope)—use whichever is closer to the traveled lane: increased percentage from 
14% to 18% 
• Empirical Bayes expected crashes: increased percentage from 14% to 18% 
• Excess expected crashes: increased percentage from 14% to 18% 
 
The rationale for removing AADT as a standalone variable was its inclusion into other scored 
factors already used in the methodology. For example, AADT is used as a component of five 
separate elements: (1) Maximum Embankment Height, (2) Maximum Embankment Slope, (3) 
Distance from Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object, (4) Empirical Bayes 
Expected Crashes, and (5) Excess Expected Crashes. The concern among the research team and 
study advisory committee was that including AADT as a standalone variable would significantly 
overweight it as the “super” factor among all factors. Therefore, for the reasons listed here, the 
decision was made to remove it as a standalone element.  
 
The shoulder width element was also removed as a scoring factor for consideration. Similar to the 
removal of AADT, shoulder width was removed due to its inclusion into other rated elements—
Horizontal distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the (nearest fixed object) or (critical 
slope). The horizontal distance rating element allowed planners to determine if minimum clear 
zone requirements were met and rendered the need for shoulder width unnecessary.       
 
The remaining elements either decreased or increased in value commensurate with their 
importance to guardrail need. Speed limit and lane width each decreased to 5 percent weighted 
values for the new model, respectively. The research team reduced their percentages due to each 
element’s general overall uniformity amongst competing guardrail projects. For example, many 
guardrail projects have similar speed limits thereby rendering the use of this metric for comparison 
purposes less useful. The remaining elements all increased proportionately to 18 percent. This list 
includes: (1) maximum embankment slope, (2) maximum embankment height, (3) horizontal 
distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the nearest fixed object or critical slope, (4) 
Empirical Bayes expected crashes, and (5) excess expected crashes. These rating elements 
received increases in their value due to their strong influence on crash outcomes, most notably 
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crash frequency and severity, which has a direct link to guardrail need. Collectively, the summation 
of these rating elements is equal to 100.   
 
4.2.5 Rating Element Scores 
After weight assignments, each rating element received a score corresponding to select attributes. 
Each rating element was scored on a scale of 0-10 points, which assigned a consistent scale for 
each element. Maintaining this scale across all rating elements allowed for a simple scoring 
application before the follow-on weighting assignment. For example, if a location received a score 
of 10 for its EEC, that rating element would be multiplied by 18% to determine how much it 
contributed to the overall project score.  
 
The Empirical Bayes (EB) expected crashes and excess expected crashes (EEC) each received an 
assigned point score based on their distribution within subdivided categories. In this methodology, 
the aggregated EB and EEC rating elements were assigned categorizations within 5 distinct value 
ranges, or bins. Each bin contained approximately the same number of rating element values 
distributed across the entire 4,600 projects currently identified in the KYTC GRP database. Rating 
elements assigned to low-value bins were less likely to occur and consequently received lower 
point values. For example, an EB less than one meant that less than one crash was expected to 
occur at a location within the next 5 years. Therefore, that category received zero points. Similarly, 
an EEC value less than zero meant fewer crashes were occurring than expected, also earning a 
score of 0. The remaining four bins for EB and EEC were based on the distributions of the two 
metrics for each project found in the GRP database. The point distributions for EB and EEC are 
shown in Tables 8 and 9 below. 
 
   
Table 8 EB Points 
       
 
  Table 9 EEC Points 
 
 
Using the same approach, the next rating element, lane widths, divided bins into a nearly equal 
number of projects for each bin. The speed limit rating element adopted a slightly different 
approach to rating element categorization. The research team assigned point values across this 
range based on common speed limits for guardrail site locations, although the majority of sites fall 
into the 55 mph bin. Both lane width and speed limit distribution are shown in Tables 10 and 11 
below.  
 
EB Points
<1 0
1<x<=5 3
5<x<=10 5
10<x<=15 7
>15 10
EEC Points
<0 0
0<x<=1 3
1<x<=5 5
5<x<=10 7
>10 10
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Table 10 Lane Width Points 
 
Table 11 Speed Limit Points 
 
The remaining rating elements tiered into 5 distinct categories as before, but also relied upon 
AADT as a distinguishing factor. Therefore, the maximum embankment height, maximum 
embankment slope, and distance from the edge of through traveled lane to the (nearest fixed object) 
or (critical slope) used a matrix table to account for both ranges. The AADT bins also reflected 
nearly equal portions of guardrail sites within each bin, similar to the development of the other 
bins.    
 
The rationale for including AADT into the point matrix was to assess the risk of crash frequency 
for each rating element. A higher AADT meant an increased volume of vehicles traveling and a 
greater potential for a run-off-road crash. Therefore, the point assignment increased both as AADT 
increased and as the rating elements became more severe. All three rating element matrices are 
shown below, in Tables 12, 13, and 14.  
 
Table 12 Embankment Height Points 
 
 
Table 13 Embankment Slope Points 
 
 
Lane Width (ft) Points
<8 10
8<=x<9 7
9=<x<10 5
10<=x<11 3
>=11 0
Speed Limit (mph) Points
<=25 0
26-35 3
36-45 5
46-55 7
56-70 10
0-250 251-500 501-1000 1001-2000 >2000
<=5 0 0 0 0 0
5<x<=10 1 2 3 4 5
10<x<=15 2 3 4 5 7
15<x<=20 3 4 5 6 8
>20 4 5 6 8 10
Embankment 
Height (ft)
AADT
0-250 251-500 501-1000 1001-2000 >2000
Flatter than 5:1 0 0 0 0 0
5:1 to 4:1 2 3 4 5 7
Steeper than 4:1 4 5 6 8 10
AADTEmbankment 
Slope
 KTC Research Report Evaluation of Guardrail Needs/Update of Guardrail Rating Program 32 
Table 14 Horizontal Distance (Fixed Object/Critical Slope) Points 
 
 
 
4.2.6 Comparison of Old and New GRP Models  
Researchers applied the new guardrail rating model #5 to current locations in the guardrail 
database, and directly compared the ranking of elements to the previous GRP model. Researchers 
quantified the significance in ranking changes between models using the statistical measure 
Spearman’s Rho. This non-parametric test measures the strength of the association between two 
variables. In this case, the two associated variables were a site’s ranking in the previous GRP 
system and its corresponding ranking using the new GRP model. One limitation in this analysis is 
that the current GRP method does not collect data on “Horizontal Distance from the Edge of the 
Through Traveled Lane to the Critical Slope”. Therefore, this element was not incorporated into 
this analysis and all project scores and rankings were calculated using “Horizontal Distance from 
the Edge of Through Traveled Lane to the Nearest Fixed Object”.    
 
After running both models, project rankings were tabulated for all sites, both old and new. Higher 
rankings for guardrail need were associated with lower numerical values (e.g., rank #1 received 
the highest assigned priority for guardrail need). Both lists with full rankings were compared using 
the correlation function found in Microsoft Excel to determine a Spearman’s Rho value of 0.708. 
In Spearman’s Rho, an R-value equal to 1 is interpreted as a perfect positive correlation while an 
R-value equal to -1 is a perfect negative correlation. In other words, a positive 1 value means each 
set of corresponding variables between two datasets are identical. Thus, a Spearman’s Rho value 
of 0.708 demonstrated a high positive correlation between the old rankings and the new rankings. 
Essentially, the new model improved upon the old model but did not significantly alter the overall 
guardrail need rankings as an aggregate. In Table 15 below, the top-10 rankings found in the 
previous GRP model are shown with their newly assigned rankings using the new model.     
 
0-250 251-500 501-1000 1001-2000 >2000
<=7 4 5 6 8 10
7<x<=10 3 4 5 6 8
10<x<=12 2 3 4 5 7
12<x<=14 1 2 3 4 5
>14 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed Object/ 
Shoulder (ft)
AADT
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Table 15 Top 10 Locations by Old Method 
 
 
As shown here, only one project retains its top 10 ranking in the new model (i.e., #1 old rank 
transitioned to a #9 new rank). The remaining sites decreased in ranking value. Three sites slightly 
decreased in rankings moving to #11, #13.5, and #18.5, respectively. In total, eight sites stayed 
within the top 100 list, while only two fell outside the top 100 (i.e., #172.5 and #324).  
 
The total guardrail need database contained over 4,000 locations. An examination of the entire 
dataset revealed that only 23 sites in the original top 100 rankings decreased significantly in 
priority. Those sites were ranked greater than 500 with the new model. Further examination of 
these 23 sites demonstrated that only six of them had five or more crashes within the last five 
years. All 23 sites experienced a relatively low Expected Excess Crash value meaning they were 
not experiencing more crashes than expected. In addition, only seven of these sites had AADT 
values exceeding 2,000, indicating relatively low traffic volumes. Therefore, the model 
demonstrated its emphasis on road departure crashes, including AADT, comprising a key 
component to modeling potential crash exposure. In Table 16 below, the newly assigned top-10 
rankings are shown with model #5.    
 
Table 16 Top 10 Locations by New Method 
 
 
Several sites on this list were ranked rather low using the previous methodology. In fact, six of the 
ten did not even make the top 500 rankings with the previous methodology. Expanding this 
RT_Unique BMP EMP Length Old Score New Score Old Rank New Rank
016-KY-0070  -000 11.117 11.226 0.109 89 86 1 9
098-KY-0194  -000 54 55 1 87 59.1 2 324
010-KY-0005  -000 3.959 4.794 0.835 86 80.6 3 18.5
055-US-0421  -000 4.73 5.16 0.43 85 84.2 5 11
058-KY-1107  -000 0 0.28 0.28 85 82.7 5 13.5
049-KY-0036  -000 12.4 12.5 0.1 85 64.4 5 172.5
043-US-0062  -000 26.499 26.705 0.206 84 72.6 7.5 52.5
036-KY-1428  -000 11.867 11.931 0.064 84 71.9 7.5 60
098-KY-1499  -000 0 0.117 0.117 83 79.1 11.5 20.5
105-US-0025  -000 10.2 10.39 0.19 83 75.5 11.5 31.5
RT_Unique BMP EMP Length Old Score New Score Old Rank New Rank
093-KY-0053  -000 0 0.87 0.87 50 95 962.5 1
106-KY-0053  -000 2.3 2.5 0.2 75 90.6 79 2
093-KY-1694  -000 0.376 0.654 0.278 48 89.6 1141.5 3
010-KY-0168  -000 6.711 7 0.289 72 87.6 113.5 4
056-KY-2052  -000 0.693 0.729 0.036 47 87.1 1247 5
081-US-0062  -000 10.5 11 0.5 77 87 58 6.5
035-KY-0032  -000 10 10.615 0.615 53 87 776.5 6.5
019-US-0027  -000 18.961 19.16 0.199 43 86.1 1671.5 8
016-KY-0070  -000 11.117 11.226 0.109 89 86 1 9
103-US-0060  -000 1.892 2.077 0.185 82 84.5 17 10
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analysis, the new model listed 37 sites now ranked within the top 100 that previously were ranked 
greater than 500. Researchers examined these 37 sites and found that all of them possessed an 
AADT greater than 2,000. Moreover, 14 of the 37 sites had an EEC equal to or greater than 5. 
These high EEC values demonstrate that the new model targets locations experiencing more run-
off-road crashes than expected. Many of these sites demonstrated high-risk factors related to crash 
severity including speed limits equal to or greater than 55 miles per hour, fixed objects closer than 
7 feet, embankment heights equal to or greater than 15 feet, and embankment slopes equal to or 
greater than 3:1. Combining these crash severity and crash frequency factors provides a strong 
rationale for why these locations moved up significantly in the new ranking structure, and 
demonstrates the efficacy of the new model.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The KTC research team employed best practices in safety analysis, including key concepts from 
the Highway Safety Manual, to improve upon the existing KYTC guardrail rating program (GRP) 
model. In this study, the team collaborated with the KYTC study advisory committee to understand 
how they collect, process, and prioritize their guardrail need rankings at sites across the state. The 
primary factors impacting run-off-road crashes were examined across a comprehensive literature 
review and incorporated into the model’s analysis. Most notably, all guardrail ranking elements 
used in scoring were connected with crash severity and/or crash frequency. Severe crashes are 
most commonly associated with the presence of roadside hazards, such as steep slopes or fixed 
objects, and are the primary reason why roadside barriers such as guardrail are initially considered. 
Furthermore, crash frequency measures the probability that a run-off-road crash will occur at a 
location. In the model that was developed, locations that demonstrate severe crash risk and have a 
high probability of run-off-road crashes receive higher priority than other locations.  
 
5.1  Findings 
The KTC research team developed the newest rating model (model #5) using assigned weightings 
and scores of certain elements. Eight elements comprised the final scored list used to assigned 
guardrail rankings. The final weighting structure included: 
 
• Speed Limit – 5% 
• Lane Width – 5% 
• Maximum Embankment Slope – 18% 
• Maximum Embankment Height – 18% 
• Horizontal Distance from the Edge of the Through Traveled Lane to the (Nearest Fixed 
Object) or (Critical Slope) – 18% 
• Empirical Bayes Expected Crashes – 18% 
• Excess Expected Crashes – 18% 
 
When researchers compared the new guardrail rating model to the previous model, they analyzed 
the rankings of current guardrail need locations in the database. The new model #5 improved upon 
the old model but did not significantly alter the rankings of guardrail needs. For example, 23 of 
the guardrail sites originally ranked as high-need fell in the rankings with the new model. An 
evaluation of the 23 sites demonstrated that only six of them had five or more crashes within the 
last five years, and all 23 sites had low EEC values, meaning they were not experiencing more 
crashes than expected. AADT, a key component in modeling potential crash exposure, scored high 
in only seven sites, which indicates lower traffic volumes.  
  
Many of the 23 sites had high-risk factors related to crash severity such as: speed limits above 55 
miles per hour, fixed objects closer than 7 feet, embankment heights equal to or greater than 15 
feet, and embankment slopes of 3:1 or greater. By emphasizing crash frequency and crash severity, 
the new model targets locations with a higher number of road departure crashes than would be 
expected. These higher-risk locations moved up significantly in the new ranking structure, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the new guardrail prioritization model. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
The KTC research team recommends the following items for implementation based on the results 
of this research study: 
 
• Adopt the new GRP model #5 methodology for use in ranking guardrail need projects 
across the state 
• Provide KYTC personnel, including district offices, with the newly revised guardrail 
survey form to collect the necessary data 
• Provide information and training sessions to KYTC personnel on the development rationale 
for the new model and its subsequent implementation  
• Update the GRP online application and back-end IT architecture to match the new model 
data collection and processing requirements 
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Appendix A – Current Guardrail Survey Form 
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Appendix B – Current Hazard-Index Point System 
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Appendix C – New Guardrail Survey Form 
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